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Abstract
We contribute to the debate on the impact of unilateral climate policy with a two-country two-…rm international oligopoly model accounting
for endogenous plant location and heterogeneity in both country size and
…rm’s emissions technology. Our results suggest that, if the carbon price
di¤erential is moderate as compared to unit transport costs and the relative size of the highly regulated country is big enough, a no relocation
equilibrium may prevail also in the long run. A large market asymmetry
coupled with a small technology gap emerges as the only con…guration
in which unilateral climate policy leads to a fall in world emissions irrespective of the optimal location choice. Thus for being e¤ective and
not leading to production relocation, unilateral climate policy should be
moderate, implemented by a su¢ ciently large area and complemented by
mechanisms for promoting the international transfer of clean technologies.
Welfare implications are also discussed.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment. Carbon leakage. Climate Policy. Emissions Technologies.
JEL Classi…cation Numbers: F12, F23, Q58.
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Introduction

Climate policies will remain sub global in the foreseeable future, as obstacles
to a global climate agreement are still substantial (Branger and Quiron, 2014;
Bosetti and De Cian, 2013). It is thus important to better understand the
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impact of unilateral measures in a long term perspective, for contributing to
the ongoing debate in developed countries on climate policy’s design in a world
with uneven commitments.1
The debate centres on the likelihood of carbon leakage and of adverse competitiveness e¤ ects on domestic …rms in emissions-intensive sectors. Politicians
worry that the more stringent national mitigation measures might lead domestic
production and jobs shifting to other less regulated regions (the so called Pollution Havens).2 Carbon leakage takes place if a policy aimed to limit emissions
in a region is the direct cause of an increase in emissions outside the region
itself, thus hampering its e¤ectiveness. Two main competitiveness mechanisms
may drive carbon leakage: short-term impacts mainly via trade ‡ows and longterm responses involving also relocation decisions via foreign direct investment
(FDI).3 FDI represents a critical mechanism in assessing the threat of carbon
and job leakage since it may lead to major discontinuous changes, implying considerable losses in domestic production and employment. When analysing the
impact of unilateral climate policy, it is thus important to take into account
that …rms are internationally mobile, capturing the e¤ect of the more stringent
climate measures on the domestic …rms’international location choices.
A rich theoretical and empirical literature has analysed the e¤ectiveness of
unilateral climate policy and its impact on competitiveness. A …rst group of
theoretical studies focuses on the so-called pollution haven hypothesis (PHH)
(see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2003), adopting a general equilibrium approach and overlooking the role of FDI.4 Similarly, most CGE models analyze
the likelihood of carbon leakage not accounting for shifts in location choices.
A growing body of theoretical literature on environmental policy and FDI has
appeared in recent years.5 Some of these studies focus on optimal environmental policy within a given market structure, not considering the location choice
(Bayindir-Upmann, 2003; Kayalica and Lahiri, 2005; Cole et al., 2006). Others
tackle the impact of environmental policy on domestic …rms location decisions
(and thus on outward FDI), with models endogenizing both location and policy
decisions (e.g. Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003, Ulph and Valentini, 2001; Abe
1 For the debate on the new EU climate and energy package setting 2030 targets, see for
instance PBL (2012), and Financial Times, "EU must improve its aim on energy", December
2, 2013.
2 In the policy debate the key issue is the e¤ect of tight regulation on the pro…tability of
domestic production, more than on national …rms’global pro…ts.
3 Reinaud (2008, p. 3) indicates that there is also a third channel (the fossil fuel price channel), but focuses on the two competitiveness-driven channels, as they can be more realistically
addressed via national policies.
4 These models predict that, due to the liberalisation of trade, …rms active in pollutionintensive sectors, and operating in countries adopting more restrictive environmental policies,
will transfer production abroad and will serve the domestic market from these new foreign
plants.
5 Early models (Markusen et al., 1993; Motta and Thisse, 1994), endogenizing the location
decision but not environmental policy, give interesting insights. However these studies are
concerned with symmetric countries and considered local pollution. See also Rauscher (1995)
and Hoel (1997) for models where both governments and …rms location decisions are treated
as endogenous.
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and Zhao, 2005; Ikefuji et al., 2010, 2013; Lee, Lee and Kang, 2014). In order to
capture both countries’and …rms’decisions, these models are based on a very
stylized set-up, assuming that pollution is local, there are no transport costs
and the two areas (adopting mitigation policy or not) are of the same market
size. Such an approach does not allow to understand the impact of unilateral
climate policy on global emissions (as in the case of greenhouse gases (GHGs))
and to fully capture its competitiveness implications.6 Moreover, although most
of these studies generally predict a major shift of domestic activities abroad, the
empirical literature has shown that the evidence is mixed (Branger and Quiron,
2014).7
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of unilateral climate policy
considering internationally mobile …rms which operate in a context characterized by both country and …rm heterogeneity. We build on two new strands of
literature separately addressing one or the other source of heterogeneity. SannaRandaccio and Sestini (2012) draw attention to the role of market size and
market size asymmetry, an issue surprisingly neglected in the formal literature
on unilateral climate policy and FDI.8 Their model, allowing for endogenous
plant location, shows that a larger size of the regulated area, as compared to
the non-complying one, is a powerful centripetal force when transport costs are
high, discouraging relocation of domestic producers in carbon intensive industries. This is a major reason why also in the long term a higher carbon tax
not necessarily leads …rms in the regulated area to move production abroad.
A major shortcoming of Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini (2012) is the assumption that …rms in the two regions have the same emissions technology. This
hypothesis is contradicted by recent empirical research. In a major study on
international di¤erences in emissions intensity, Douglas and Nishioka (2012)9
…nd that “emissions intensities di¤er systematically across countries because of
di¤erences in production techniques”. Their results indicate that …rms in developing countries are signi…cantly more emissions-intensive than competitors
6 Another strand of theoretical literature shows that restrictive unilateral climate measures
may attract strategic inward FDI. This is considered as one of the mechanism explaining the
lack of satisfactory evidence on the PHH (Elliot and Zhou, 2013; Dijkstra et al., 2011).
7 Studies testing the PHH by considering inter-country FDI location choice do not …nd
robust support for this prediction (Smarzynska Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Xing and Kolstad, 2002; Wagner and Timmins, 2009; Manderson and Kneller,
2012). Mixed evidence is provided by studies on intra-country FDI location choice, analyzing whether di¤erences in environmental stringency across sub-national units (i.e. US states,
Chinese provinces) a¤ect the spatial allocation of FDI within a country (see e.g. Keller and
Levinson, 2002; Dean et al., 2005). As suggested by Mulatu et al. (2010), this last strand
of literature does not really test the “pollution haven” hypothesis. However, in a recent
study Aichele and Felbermayr (2014) conclude that the Kyoto protocol has been ine¤ective
or possibly even harmful for the global climate.
8 Market size and market asymmetry have instead been recognized as critical factors in
models tackling the e¤ectiveness of climate policy from other perspectives (Böhringer, Fisher
and Rosendahl, 2011; see Branger and Quiron, 2014, for a survey ). In the environment and
FDI literature an exception is Zeng and Zhao (2009), who consider market asymmetry within
a monopolistic competition model.
9 Douglas and Nishioka (2012) calculate sector-speci…c and country-speci…c emissions intensity coe¢ cients for 39 countries and 41 industrial sectors for the year 2000.
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in developed nations. Similar results have been obtained by Albornoz, Cole,
Elliot and Ercolani (2009) and Eskeland and Harrison (2003).10 To account
for …rm heterogeneity, we draw from another strand of literature focusing on
how di¤erences in emissions technologies across …rms a¤ect the impact of new
environmental taxes on aggregate emissions. Sugeta and Matsumoto (2005),
although not addressing speci…cally the case of unilateral climate policy, o¤er
interesting insights showing that the e¤ectiveness of pollution taxation depends
upon the technology gap across …rms. As most of the analysis is undertaken in
a closed economy setting, country heterogeneity and endogenous plant location
choices are not captured by the model. Lahiri and Symeonidis (2007) build a
two- country model where …rms in di¤erent countries are characterized by asymmetry in pollution-intensity coe¢ cients. They show that, whenever the country
with the less pollution-intensive technology unilaterally increases its emissions
tax, total emissions may rise if the technology gap is su¢ ciently high. In this
model too, …rms are not geographically mobile (i.e. relocation is not an option)
and markets are of the same size.
We contribute to this literature providing an international oligopoly model,
with endogenous plant location, in which the role of heterogeneity in both country size and …rm emissions technology is accounted for, thus bringing the analysis closer to reality. Adopting a long term perspective (as explained in section
2), we present a model assessing under which institutional and technological
scenarios unilateral climate policy may be e¤ective and claims of domestic production and job losses may be overrated. The model catches the main features
of pollution-intensive sectors,11 allowing for transport costs, plant-speci…c …xed
costs, accounting for global industrial pollution, and considering both partial
and total relocation. We assume free intra-…rm technology transfer across borders, but no inter-…rm exchanges of technology.12 The model thus captures the
main centripetal and centrifugal forces driving the location decision when …rms
are confronted with unilateral climate measures (considered here as exogenous).
The problem is structured as a two-stage game: in the …rst stage the …rm based
in the cooperating area determines its location, while in the second stage the
two …rms decide simultaneously how much to sell in each market, competing a
la Cournot.
We …nd that, when the carbon price di¤erential between the two regions
(with and without stringent climate measures) is more than compensated by
transport costs (the so called high transport cost case), and the size of the cooperating area is su¢ ciently large, an equilibrium with no relocation (henceforth
1 0 The results of Eskeland and Harrison (2003) on Côte d’Ivoire, Mexico and Venezuela
suggest that foreign-owned plants have lower levels of emissions than comparable domesticallyowned plants. Albornoz, Cole, Elliot and Ercolani (2009) …nd that in Argentina foreign-owned
manufacturing …rms are more likely to implement Environmental Management Systems than
locally-owned producers.
1 1 These industries are capital intensive (and thus …rms bear high …xed plant costs), generally
vertically integrated, produce bulk commodities with a high weight/value ratio and are thus
characterized by large transportation costs (see e.g. Reinaud, 2008; Ederington et al., 2005).
1 2 On the impact of asymmetric pollution emissions standards on international location
choices in the presence of inter-…rm spillovers see Lee, Lee and Kand (2014).
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N R) may prevail in the long run, notwithstanding the unilateral climate measures. Instead, if the carbon price di¤erential is excessively high as compared
to unit transport costs, the only feasible equilibrium location is total relocation
(T R), with major losses in domestic production and jobs. The e¤ectiveness of
unilateral climate policy is shown to depend on the joint e¤ ect of country and
…rm heterogeneity. Allowing for …rms’ heterogeneity, in contrast with SannaRandaccio and Sestini (2012), we …nd that a no relocation equilibrium is not
a su¢ cient condition for having a fall in global emissions when a unilateral
carbon tax is implemented. A large market asymmetry coupled with a small
technology gap is the only con…guration in which unilateral climate policy will
certainly lead to a fall in world emissions, irrespective of the optimal location
choice.13 Moreover, a small emissions technology gap plays also a crucial role
in bringing about an increase in social welfare as a whole.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the impact of unilateral climate measures on the international location
choice. Section 4 addresses how heterogeneity in emission intensity in‡uences
the international location choice. Section 5 explores the e¤ectiveness of unilateral climate measures. Section 6 presents some welfare implications and Section
7 the main conclusions.

2

The basic framework

Let us consider a partial equilibrium model with two countries (areas)14 and
two …rms, 1 and 2. Also, let us de…ne as the baseline the scenario where the two
…rms manufacture the same homogeneous good in country I and II respectively,
and export to the other country due to “reciprocal dumping”. Domestic and
foreign inverse demand functions are linear and write as
PK = aK

bK (qi;K + qj;K )

(1)

with i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j; K = I; II , where qi;K denotes the output sold by …rm
i in country K. In order to capture heterogeneity in market size as in SannaRandaccio and Sestini (2012) and Zeng and Zhao (2009), we assume that country
I is larger than country II by setting aI > aII and bI < bII .
The two …rms face a constant marginal production cost15 c and a …xed cost
Gi;K necessary to install a manufacturing plant (at home and/or abroad). There
is also a …xed cost at the …rm level F , which captures …rm-speci…c activities
such as advertising, marketing, distribution and managerial services. Firms
are heterogeneous as to emissions technologies. We assume that the emissions
coe¢ cient ei , which measures emissions per unit of output, is …rm-speci…c with
1 3 On the role of the technological gap as a driver of emissions reduction, see also Golombek
and Hoel (2006).
1 4 Each country may be thought of as a group of nations applying the same degree of
stringency in mitigation policy.
1 5 The parameter c may be in‡uenced by country-speci…c and …rm-speci…c factors. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that c1 = c2 = c.
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0 < e1 < e2
1. Accordingly, the cleaner …rm is based in the larger country.
Finally, the attention is focused on global industrial pollution as in the case
of GHGs emissions. In the baseline the price of emissions is the same in both
areas, with tI = tII .
Then, we de…ne an alternative scenario where the carbon tax in country I
is higher as compared with country II (i.e. tI > tII ). Such unilateral climate
policy may have di¤erent repercussions on the local …rm’s location strategy.
We assume that …rm’s 2 location choice is exogenous, as this …rm may only
produce in its home country and exports to the foreign market, whilst …rm’s 1
location choice is endogenous, with …rm 1 choosing to serve the foreign market
via export or FDI. Export implies an additional marginal (and unit) transport
cost s, with s > tII , whilst FDI involves plant speci…c …xed costs associated to
the plant in the foreign market. In particular, …rm 1 may choose to produce in
the home country and serve the foreign market via export (i.e. no relocation
(N R)). It may open a plant also in country II, serving both markets via local
production (partial relocation (P R)). Finally, …rm 1 may move all production
abroad, and export back to the home market (total relocation (T R)). This is
the case implicitly assumed in the pollution haven and carbon leakage debates.
To summarize, …rm 1’s location strategy space is given by S1 = fN R; P R; T Rg.
In what follows we set that G1;I = G1;II = G2;II = G. This implies that …xed
plant costs are not sunk in any country before the game starts. Thus we are
considering a long-term perspective, as for instance in Markusen et al. (1993),
due to the possible non-transitory nature of uneven abatement commitments
between the two areas.
We consider a two-stage game that develops as follows: at the …rst stage
…rm 1 determines its location, while at the second stage …rm 1 and …rm 2
decide simultaneously how much to sell in each market. The game is solved as
usual by backward induction. We start by determining the equilibrium sales
by each …rm in the di¤erent con…gurations, and then we solve for the optimal
location choice of …rm 1 in the …rst stage.16

3

The optimal location choice

In this section, we analyze the impact of unilateral climate policy enacted by the
larger and cleaner area (country I) on the local …rm optimal location choice.17
For ease of exposition, we de…ne as low transport costs the case with s < e1 (tI
tII ), observed whenever unit transport costs are lower than the additional unit
costs due to the carbon price di¤erential; on the contrary we label high transport
cost the case with s > e1 (tI tII ).
In order to identify the optimal location choice of …rm 1, under the assump1 6 As the solution of the second stage of the game is in line with the traditional literature on
quantity competition à la Cournot, for lack of space, we do not provide details on this stage.
1 7 By considering unilateral climate policy by the larger and cleaner area, we capture the
fact that developed countries, which have the technology lead, implement more stringent
mitigation measures than emerging and developing nations.
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tion that tI > tII , we start considering whether there are circumstances such
that relocating the whole production abroad (i.e. the T R location strategy) is
preferred over producing only at home (i.e. the N R location choice).
To this aim, it su¢ ces to compare equilibrium pro…ts under the NR market
R
^TR
con…guration ( ^ N
1 ) and equilibrium pro…ts under the TR case ( 1 ), namely:
R
^N
1

^ T1 R = 4
9

s

AI
bI

AII
bII

e1 (tI

tII )

AI
(AII s)
s2
+
+
bI
bII
bII

(2)
with AI = [aI c e1 tI + (e2 e1 )tII ] > 0, AII = [aII c e1 tI + (e2 e1 )tII ] >
0 and AII s > 0 (see Appendix I). Unilateral climate policy has three contrasting e¤ects on the local …rm’s location decision, when choosing between N R and
T R. The climate policies asymmetry e¤ect, captured by the second term in curly
brackets in Eq. (2), represents a powerful centrifugal force. As expected, the
more stringent carbon tax (tI > tII ) induces …rm 1 to move production abroad
for taking advantage of the lower emission price. The e¤ect of the carbon tax
di¤erential depends on …rm 1’s emission coe¢ cient (e1 ). Since the carbon tax
is set on emissions, its impact on …rm i0 s unit variable cost obviously depends
on ei , which captures …rm i ’s emissions for unit of output. Nevertheless, the
incentive to total relocation can be mitigated by two centripetal forces. First,
we can identify a market asymmetry e¤ ect, captured by the …rst term in curly
brackets: as s > 0, the larger the size of the home market the more pro…table is
the no relocation choice, since total transport costs are lower when producing in
the large country and exporting to the small one (the N R case), than viceversa
(the T R scenario). Furthermore, …rm 1 can be prevented from total relocation
2
by a lower competition e¤ ect, captured by the third term (i.e. bsII ). As the
intensity of competition is a function -inter alia- of transport costs, the higher
these costs, the more di¢ cult for the outside competitor to penetrate country I
and thus the stronger the incentive for …rm 1 to produce in its home country.
We prove in Appendix I that, in the low transport costs scenario ( s < e1 (tI
tII )) total relocation always dominates over no relocation as the centrifugal force
always prevails over the centripetal ones: Nevertheless, in the high transport
cost scenario (s > e1 (tI tII )), the two centripetal forces may prevail on the
centrifugal one and thus no relocation may dominate total relocation.
When the total relocation choice does not belong to the equilibrium path,
one needs to investigate whether there are conditions such that the incentive
R
to keep the whole production at home, thereby getting pro…ts ^ N
1 , dominates
R
that to partially relocate productive activities, obtaining thus ^ P
1 . We obtain
that:
4
(AII s)
R
R
^N
^P
=G
[s + e1 (tI tII )]
(3)
1
1
9
bII
Eq. (3) shows that here there are two centrifugal forces at work: the carbon
price di¤erential and unit transport costs. By choosing P R, and thus producing
in both countries, …rm 1 would bene…t, as compared to the N R choice, not only
from the lower emission prices in country II but also from saving in transport
costs. On the other hand, P R is the high …xed cost option as it involves two
7

plants. These additional plant …xed costs are a powerful centripetal force since
they discourage relocating production abroad.
Moreover, when keeping the whole production at home is not the optimal
location strategy, one may wonder whether a partial relocation choice (P R)
can be preferred over total relocation (T R). From the comparison between
R
and pro…ts
equilibrium pro…ts accruing to …rm 1 under partial relocation ^ P
1
TR
^
observed under total relocation 1 , we have:
R
^P
1

^ T1 R = 4 [s
9

e1 (tI

tII )]

AI
bI

G:

(4)

When comparing partial with total relocation, the bene…ts from the lower carbon tax in country II and transport costs savings go into opposite directions,
the …rst e¤ect discouraging partial relocation while the second favoring it. In
the low transport cost case - s < e1 (tI tII )-, partial relocation involves not
only additional …xed costs associated to the second plant but also lower variable
R
pro…ts. Thus, it follows that ^ P
< ^ T R : On the other hand, in the high trans1
port cost scenario - with s > e1 (tI tII )-, the usual trade o¤ between higher
variable pro…ts versus higher …xed costs associated with the decision to produce
in both countries instead of servicing one country via export is at work.
Summarizing the above results, we can state that:
Proposition 1 In the low transport costs scenario, under unilateral climate
policy, total relocation (TR) by the local …rm always prevails at equilibrium.
In the high transport costs case, even no relocation (NR) or partial (PR) may
occur.
Quite interestingly, it follows from the above that a more stringent climate
policy implemented by country I does not lead a priori to the emergence of
the so-called pollution havens, as no relocation or partial relocation of …rm 1’s
productive activities can be observed at equilibrium in the high transport cost
scenario.
In order to illustrate under which circumstances, with high transport costs,
each equilibrium prevails, we identify equilibrium areas focusing on two critical
variables: the size of the foreign market18 (aII ) and unit transport costs (s).
R
Let us denote by aII the size of the foreign market such that ^ N
= ^ T1 R (see
1
Appendix II, Eq. (A.II.1)). Thus, for aII < aII , NR always dominates TR, and
viceversa. Let us also indicate by aII the size of the foreign market such that
^ N R = ^ P R (see Appendix II, Eq. (A.II.2)): Then, the NR choice dominates
1
1
over PR for any aII < aII , and viceversa. We consider both aII and aII as
functions only of s. So, the two functions aII (s) and aII (s) indicate (s, aII )
combinations for which the indi¤erence conditions between the N R and T R
choices and the N R and PR choices, respectively, hold: In particular, we prove
that while aII (s) is increasing in s; in the relevant range of parameters aII (s)
is decreasing in s: Also, aII js=0 > aII js=0 holds (see Appendix II):
1 8 This variable captures also the e¤ect of market size asymmetry since the size of country
I is given.
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We may thus map these two indi¤erence conditions (aII (s) and aII (s) ) in
the (s, aII ) plane. In Figure 1, we can see that they cross at (s ; aII (s )), where
s =

9 bI G
+ e1 (tI
4 AI

tII ):

(5)

Accordingly, at (s ; aII (s )) both Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) are satis…ed as equality.
Notice that, as AI > 0, one may conclude that s > 0 and s > e1 (tI tII ); i.e.
we are in the high transport cost scenario. Moreover, we …nd that s is also the
value of unit transport costs for which there is indi¤erence between partial and
total relocation, and such that, for s > s ; P R dominates T R and viceversa (see
R
= ^ T1 R can be represented
Appendix III). Thus the indi¤erence condition ^ P
1
in the (s, aII ) plane as a vertical line passing for s . The three indi¤erence
conditions considered above de…ne the equilibrium areas.19
A third variable, …xed plant costs (G), a¤ects the (s , aII (s )) values, thus
shaping the equilibrium areas. In particular, Eq.(A.II.2) shows that the position
II
of the aII (s) function depends also on G. Being @a
@G > 0; as …xed plant costs
1 9 We may also label as a
II;min the value of aII such that the equilibrium quantity sold by
N R (a
…rm 1 in country II under NR is nil, say qb1;II
II;min ) = 0: The function aII;min is increasing
in s (see Figure 1). For aII < aII;min we are in the No Export region (NE) in which serving
the foreign market is not pro…table.
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rise, the curve de…ning the boundary between the N R and P R choices shifts
upward. To capture the role of …xed plant costs we de…ne with G the G value
such that aII (s (G)) = aI . Thus G de…nes the case in which both indi¤erence
conditions aII (s) and aII (s) are satis…ed when the two areas (with and without
stringent climate policies) are of the same size. Let us de…ne by GM (standing
for moderate …xed plant costs) any positive value of G such that G < G, and by
GH any value such that G > G . It follows that in the (s, aII ) plane, the curve
aII (s) de…ned for GH (GM ) is located above (below) the aII (s) curve de…ned
for G:
Figure 1 shows20 that N R may be an equilibrium for a wide range of parameters also in the long run, that is when the …xed costs of the domestic plant
are not sunk.
Thus we can state that:
Proposition 2 In the high transport costs scenario, under unilateral climate
policy, no relocation is an equilibrium whenever aII < min(aII (s); aII (s)): On
the contrary, whenever aII > min(aII (s); aII (s)); total relocation emerges as the
equilibrium if s < s , while partial relocation takes place if s > s .
The economic intuition behind this Proposition is that, with tI > tII ; the
N R equilibrium requires a su¢ cient degree of market asymmetry (i.e. a su¢ ciently small size of the foreign less regulated market). In the case when this
asymmetry is not relevant enough, then the N R choice is dominated by either
T R or P R, depending on the magnitude of transport costs. Furthermore,
Lemma 3 The size of the foreign market such that aII < min(aII (s); aII (s))
is increasing (decreasing) in s if s < s (s > s ).
In a range of transport costs values such that T R dominates P R (i.e. when
s < s ), the condition for a N R equilibrium becomes less stringent when s rises.
If country I is the larger area, transport costs discourage total relocation as
explained above. On the contrary, when considering transport costs values for
which P R dominates T R (i.e. s > s ) the condition for an N R equilibrium
becomes more stringent when s rises, since transport costs promote partial relocation.
Furthermore, when focusing on moderate plant …xed costs, we …nd:
Proposition 4 With GM (and thus aII (s ) < aI ), when the two areas are of
the same market size, the no relocation choice cannot emerge as an equilibrium,
being dominated by total (for s < s ) or partial relocation (for s > s ).
With moderate plant …xed costs, the incentive to partially relocate is quite
strong. In this setting, the area enacting stringent mitigation measures should
2 0 The …gure is drawn for G 2 G , and thus a (s ) < a . This is a quite relevant scenario
M
I
II
since in the most important emissions intensive industries companies own plant in di¤erent
countries, showing that partial relocation is a feasible strategy. The cement industry can be
taken as an example.

10

have a larger size with respect to the non-complying area, for unilateral climate
policy leaving unchanged the domestic …rm’s equilibrium location choice.
Market asymmetry however plays a crucial role also in the case of very high
…xed plant costs GH (i.e. with aII (s ) > aI ). Here the stimulus to partial
relocation is quite weak, given the high additional …xed costs. However, with
market symmetry, or even more with “reverse” market asymmetry (thus with
country II being larger than country I), the incentive for total relocation becomes very powerful. When the non-complying countries represent the larger
area, by moving all production abroad …rm 1 bene…ts not only from the lower
price of emissions in country II but also from saving in transport costs. T R
would in fact imply producing in the large area and exporting to the small one.21
It is worth remarking that the relative size of the area enacting the unilateral climate policy plays a major role in the di¤erent scenarios considered,
although the results obtained are very industry-speci…c.22 We have shown that
with a su¢ ciently high degree of market asymmetry, the domestic …rm may be
willing to produce only in the home market also in the long term even in the
presence of tight environmental policies. However, if the carbon tax di¤erential
is so high (with respect to unit transport costs) to move the system to the low
transport cost area, market asymmetry no longer plays a role since the only
feasible equilibrium becomes T R.

4

Location choice and emissions intensity heterogeneity

We now examine whether the link between country I 0 s unilateral climate policy and the domestic …rm equilibrium location choice is a¤ected by emission
intensity heterogeneity across countries.23
Let us start considering the case when …rm 1 chooses between N R and T R.
We know from the previous section that in the low transport costs case T R is
always more pro…table than N R while, in the alternative scenario of high transport costs, the pro…tability of the choice depends on the balancing between
centrifugal (carbon price di¤erential) and centripetal (market asymmetry and
lower competition) forces. On this point, it is worth remarking that a cleaner
emissions technology for …rm 1, and thus a lower e1 , determines a larger parameters range for which the high transport costs scenario prevails thereby making
N R a feasible equilibrium. As to the dilemma between N R and T R, we prove
2 1 We present in Appendix IV a condition showing that even a moderate degree of “reverse”
market asymmetry is su¢ cient for TR to dominate always NR.
2 2 The values of the technical parameters s and G have a key role in the location choice.
2 3 A …rm’s environmental performance is captured by its emission coe¢ cient, i.e. it is
measured in terms of emissions per unit of output.
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in Appendix V that:
R
^ T R)
@( ^ N
1
1
=
@e1

8
4<
9 : +(tI

h
s (tI + tII ) b1I
h
tII ) AI e1b(tII +tII ) +

1

i

bII
i
AII s e1 (tI +tII )
bII

9
=
;

<0

(6)
Eq. (6) shows that a reduction in the emissions coe¢ cient e1 (ceteris paribus
an increase in the emissions technology gap between the two …rms) increases
the pro…tability of the no-relocation choice as compared with total relocation.
Indeed, from the …rst term in curly brackets in Eq. (6) it derives that a cleaner
production process for …rm 1 magni…es the centripetal force originated by the
market asymmetry. From the second term in Eq. (6), it emerges that a lower
e1 weakens the centrifugal e¤ect of the carbon price di¤erential. 24
Therefore:
Lemma 5 A lower value of e1 always promotes the no relocation (NR) choice
as compared to the total relocation one (TR).
Eq. (6) implies that, when considering a cleaner emission technology for
…rm 1, the aII (s) function, mapping the N R vs T R indi¤erence condition,
shifts upward in the (s; aII ) plane (see Figure 2). As it is found that a lower e1
promotes the NR choice as compared with T R, a given s should be associated
to a higher aII (i.e. a lower degree of market asymmetry ), for the neutrality
R
condition ^ N
= ^ T1 R to hold.
1
When comparing the NR versus the PR location choice, a lower e1 moves
the two centrifugal forces promoting partial relocation (transport cost savings
and carbon price di¤erential) in opposite directions and thus the sign of the
derivative cannot be univocally determined. We …nd that

R
^ P R)
4
@( ^ N
1
1
=
@e1
9

s

(tI + tII )
bII

(tI

tII )

AII

s

e1 (tI + tII )
bII

(7)

The positive sign of the …rst term in curly brackets indicates that a fall in e1
leads to a strengthening of the centrifugal role of s, thus promoting PR vis-à-vis
NR. On the other hand, a lower e1 leads to a weakening of the centrifugal role of
the carbon price di¤erential, captured by the second term in curly brackets, thus
discouraging PR vis-à-vis NR. In order to see whether there exist conditions such
that the net e¤ect on the NR vs PR comparison can be univocally determined,
it can be useful to analyse how a lower e1 a¤ects the aII (s) function, which
maps the NR-PR indi¤erence condition in the (s; aII ) plane. To this aim, let
II (s)
= 0 (see Appendix VI). Notice
us denote as se the s value for which @a@e
1
that, for s < se (resp. s > se), then

@aII (s)
@e1

< 0 (resp.

@aII (s)
@e1

> 0). Thus, if e1

2 4 This is the case although the cost-asymmetry due to e < e produces a market enhancing
1
2
e¤ect which increases the propensity to move abroad. See on this Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini,
2012.

12

decreases, the aII (s) function rotates clockwise around the pivot point se (see
Figure 2). Accordingly, we get that for s < se the weakening of the centrifugal
role of the carbon price di¤erential prevails, so that a more e¢ cient emission
technology for …rm 1 leads to an expansion of the NR versus the PR area. On
the other hand, for s > se, the impact of the strengthening of the centrifugal role
of transport cost savings dominates. In this case, the aII (s) curve moves to the
left and the NR area shrinks.25
Lemma 6 A lower value of e1 promotes (resp. discourages) the no relocation
(NR) choice as compared with partial relocation (PR) whenever e1 (tI tII ) <
s < se (resp. s > se > e1 (tI tII )).
Finally, in the dilemma between TR and PR, the role of e1 turns out to be
clear-cut. Indeed, it results that:
R
^ T R)
@( ^ P
1
1
=
@e1

4
9

(tI

tII )

AI
s
+ (tI + tII )
bI

e1 (tI
bI

tII )

< 0 (8)

A lower emission coe¢ cient for …rm 1 increases the pro…tability of partial
relocation with respect to total relocation, since AI > 0 (see Appendix I) and the
2 5 We recall that we consider s values such that s > e (t
1 I
would be always dominated by TR.
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tII ), otherwise NR and PR

relevant scenario is that with high transport costs.26 In particular, Eq. (8) shows
that a cleaner emission technology adopted by …rm 1 weakens the centrifugal
e¤ect of the carbon price di¤erential, thus strengthening the incentive to chooses
P R instead of T R.
Thus:
Lemma 7 A lower value of e1 promotes the partial relocation (PR) choice as
compared with total relocation (TR).
The e¤ect of a cleaner emission technology for …rm 1 on the PR/TR choice
may also be illustrated by evaluating its e¤ect on s , namely the s value such
that aII (s) = aII (s): Indeed:
4 bI G(tI + tII )
@s
+ (tI
=
@e1
9
A2I

tII ) > 0:

(9)

It follows that, if the production process of …rm 1 is cleaner (i.e. e1 is lower),
the crossing point of the two functions aII (s) and aII (s) moves leftward in the
(s; aII ) plane (see Figure 2). Accordingly, the horizontal line de…ning the TR
vs PR boundary moves leftward, so that the incentive to choose partial instead
of total relocation becomes stronger.
We may thus state that:
Proposition 8 A cleaner production process of the domestic …rm in the country
with tighter mitigation measures reduces the parameters range for which TR is
an equilibrium. Further, it promotes the NR equilibrium choice for e1 (tI tII ) <
s < se, while enhancing the PR equilibrium for s > se.

The …ndings in the above Proposition may be further quali…ed. Indeed, it
can be proved that, within the admissible parameter range, se > s holds, being
se thus located in the high transport cost area.27 Moreover, it can be shown
that se belongs to a range of s values such that an equilibrium (either P R or
N R) exists. In addition, noticing that the se threshold increases in G, when
considering the upper tail of admissible G values, se tends to become very high.
Accordingly, it follows from the above that a lower e1 , while increasing the P R
equilibrium area for very high values of s, in most cases leads to a larger N R
equilibrium region as compared with the P R one.

5

Unilateral climate policy and global emissions

We assess now the impact on global emissions of a higher unilateral carbon tax,
imposed by the larger and cleaner country (country I). To this aim, let us de…ne
eW the global emissions in the baseline scenario where both countries set the
as E
same pollution tax (tI = tII ) and there is no relocation of productive activities.
2 6 Otherwise
2 7 See

TR will always dominate PR (see Proposition 1).
Appendix VII.
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b L indicates global emissions when …rm 1 chooses location L, with
Instead E
W
L 2 fN R; P R; T Rg, as the pollution tax in country I is higher than that in
b L = e1 Q
b L + e2 Q
b L ,28 we should account
country II, namely tI > tII . Since E
1
2
W
for the interplay of two main mechanisms: the e¤ect of unilateral climate policy
on the volume of world production, labelled as volume e¤ ect, and whether the
sales of the dirtier producer (…rm 2) displace those of the cleaner …rm (…rm 1)
in the world market, labelled as product mix e¤ ect.29
We consider …rst the change in global emissions when moving from the baseline scenario to the no relocation equilibrium. As to the volume e¤ect, we can
observe that:
bN R
Q
W

eW =
Q

e1 (tI

tII )

1
1
+
3bI
3bII

<0

(10)

Eq.( 10) shows that world production decreases, reducing ceteris paribus the
level of global emissions. Since total sales fall in both markets, the volume e¤ect
is driven only by the magnitude of the world market (captured by the terms in
square brackets), while the di¤erence in size of the two markets has no role. On
the other hand, since the higher carbon tax facing …rm 1 generates a competitive
advantage for its foreign rival, the dirtier producer gains market shares as compared to the cleaner one in both countries, and thus global emissions rise due
to the product mix e¤ect (See Appendix VIII, Eq.s (A.VIII.1) and (A.VIII.2)
). The net impact of these two contrasting forces on global emissions turns out
to be:
NR
bW
E

eW =
E

e1 (tI

tII )

1
1
+
(2e1
3bI
3bII

e2 )

(11)

It follows from the above that under the NR equilibrium location choice,
unilateral mitigation measures lead to a reduction in global emissions i¤ the
emission technology gap is small (namely e1 > e22 ). Indeed, with a small technology gap, the size of the product mix e¤ect (leading to a rise in global emissions) is not relevant and thus the the volume e¤ect (reducing global emissions)
b L = qbL + qbL with i = 1; 2 and qbL denoting equilibrium sales of producer
that Q
i
i;I
i;II
1;I
i in country I in the market con…guration L.
2 9 In the trade and the environment literature using two-sector general equilibrium models
(see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2003), it is usual to distinguish three e¤ects of trade
liberalisation on the environment, following Grossman and Krueger (1993). The scale e¤ ect
captures the impact on the level of economic activity, with the composition of total production
unchanged. The composition e¤ ect indicates the change in the sectoral composition of production due to the impact of trade liberalisation on the country specialization. The technique
e¤ect re‡ects that trade liberalisation may lead to a change in the technologies adopted, with
a lowering in emissions for unit of output. Our model is di¤erent in various respects, since it
is a partial equilibrium model and consider global instead of local pollution. The mechanisms
we capture obviously present some similarities with the ones identi…ed by the trade and environment literature. So the volume e¤ect corresponds to the scale e¤ect and the product mix
e¤ect captures some elements of both the composition and the technique e¤ect. However, due
to the di¤erences in the models, there is no total comparability of these concepts. That is
why we preferred adopting a di¤erent terminology.
2 8 Notice
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dominates. On the contrary, with a large emission technology gap (e1 < e22 );
the product mix e¤ect prevails on the volume e¤ect and the unilateral climate
policy turns out to be ine¤ective under the NR equilibrium. We can thus state
the following proposition:
Proposition 9 In the case when NR is the equilibrium location choice, unilateral climate policy leads to a reduction in global pollution i¤ the emission
technology gap is su¢ ciently small.
We move now to consider the impact of a higher unilateral carbon tax on
global emissions when …rm 1 chooses partial relocation (P R) at equilibrium.
The e¤ect on global production is given by:
R
bP
Q
W

eW =
Q

R
bP
Q
1

e1 =
Q

s
:
3bII

e1 (tI tII )
3bI

(12)

It emerges from Eq.(12) that the volume e¤ect depends on the relative size of
the two areas, as total sales change in opposite directions in the two countries.
These sales fall in country I, due to the increase in price resulting from the
higher carbon tax (…rst term in square brackets). Still, they rise in country
II due to …rm 1 producing in loco (instead of exporting as in the baseline),
thereby saving on transport costs (second term in square brackets). Accordingly,
global production falls i¤ bbIII > e1 (tIs tII ) , namely in the case of a large market
asymmetry.30 An immediate by-product of the above …nding is that, for the
unilateral mitigation measures to reduce world production, the highly regulated
area has to be su¢ ciently larger than the less regulated one. The product mix
e¤ect too depends on the relative size of the two areas. As compared to the
baseline scenario, …rm 1’s sales fall in country I, due to the higher carbon tax
while increasing in country II because of the strategy shift.31 The opposite is
b P R - (resp. …rm
the case for …rm 2. Accordingly, for the total sales of …rm 1 - Q
1
P
R
b
2 - Q
-)
to
fall
(resp.
to
rise)
it
is
necessary
that
the
e¤ect
in country I
2
prevails. This is the case whenever the market asymmetry is large, since:

and

h

R
bP
Q
2

2

e1 (tI tII )
3bI

e 2 = e1 (tI tII )
Q
3bI

s
3bII

(13)

s
3bII

(14)

Notice however
i that, from Eq.s (13) and (14), with a large market asymmetry
s
> e1 (tI tII ) , while the volume of world production contracts, the dirtier

bII
bI

3 0 We

saw that PR may be an equilibrium location choice i¤

1.
3 1 Indeed,

s

e1 (tI

tII )

> 1: See Proposition

local production instead of exporting takes place in this country.
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producer displaces the cleaner one in the global market. As to the net e¤ect
on global emissions, we obtain that:
s
(2e1 e2 )
(15)
3bII
i
h
Eq. (15) shows that global emissions decrease i¤ (i) bbIII > e1 (tIs tII ) and
e1 >h e22 (a large market
i asymmetry is associated to a small technology gap), or
bII
s
(ii) bI < e1 (tI tII ) and e1 < e22 (a small market asymmetry is coupled with
a large technology gap). As far as the former condition (i), the rationale is the
following. We know that, with a large market asymmetry, the volume of world
production decreases (leading to lower global emissions) and the dirtier producer
displaces the cleaner one in the global market. The volume e¤ect prevails, and
thus global emissions fall, only if the product mix e¤ect is weak: for this to
be the case, the emission technology gap has to be rather small. A similar
economic intuition holds as to condition (ii).
h In this setting,
i world production
bII
s
rises given that market asymmetry is small bI < e1 (tI tII ) ; while the cleaner
producer displaces the dirtier one in the global market. Global emissions fall
only if the product mix e¤ect prevails on the volume e¤ect, and this requires a
large emission technology gap.
So, one can conclude that, when partial relocation is the equilibrium location
choice, the e¤ect of unilateral climate policy on global emissions depends on the
interaction of both market and technological heterogeneities. In particular,
PR
bW
E

e1 (tI tII )
3bI

eW =
E

Proposition 10 In the case when PR is the equilibrium location choice, global
pollution decreases i¤ there exist (i) a large market asymmetry and a small
technology gap, or (ii) a small market asymmetry and a large technology gap.
Finally, let us consider the e¤ect of a higher unilateral carbon tax on global
emissions under total relocation. As to the volume e¤ect, we can observe that:
b TWR
Q

eW =
Q

s

1
3bI

1
3bII

<0

(16)

Eq. (16) shows that, since we are assuming that the restrictive measures are
introduced by the larger country, world production decreases, reducing ceteris
paribus the level of global emissions. This change results from total sales falling
in country I but expanding in country II. Thus, the sign of the change in global
production is not a¤ected by the degree of market asymmetry, which however
determines the size of the e¤ect. As in the case of no relocation, the dirtier
producer gains market shares in the global market as compared to the cleaner
one (see in Appendix VIII Eq.s (A.VIII.3) and (A.VIII.4)), and thus the product
mix e¤ect ceteris paribus leads to a rise in global emissions. The net e¤ect of
these two contrasting forces on global pollution is given by:
TR
bW
E

eW =
E

s

1
3bI
17

1
(2e1
3bII

e2 )

(17)

It follows that a small emission technology gap (e1 > e22 ) is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for unilateral climate policy to be e¤ective also when total
relocation is the equilibrium location choice.
We may thus state:
Proposition 11 When TR is the equilibrium location choice, unilateral mitigation measures may lead to a reduction in global emissions i¤ the emissions
technology gap between the domestic …rm and the more pollution intensive foreign rival is su¢ ciently small.
We summarize these …ndings in Table 1.
Table 1: Forces a¤ecting the equilibrium location choice in the high
transport costs scenario
8
<

ST G

LT G

V E P M E T OT
SM A
+
:
LM
A
+
8
V E P M E T OT
<
SM A +
+
PR
:
LM
A
+
8
V E P M E T OT
<
SM A
+
TR
:
LM A
+

NR

VE

VE
+
VE

P M E T OT
+
+
+
+
P M E T OT
+
PME
+
+

+
T OT
+
+

SMA= small market asymmetry (bII =bI < s=e1 (tI tII )), LMA= large market
asymmetry (bII =bI > s=e1 (tI
tII )), STG= small technology gap (e1 > e2 =2);
LTG= large technology gap (e1
e2 =2); VE= volume e¤ect, PME= product mix
e¤ect.

It turns out that the volume e¤ect and the product mix e¤ect always run in
opposite directions. The emission technology gap has a critical role, since with
e1 > e22 (a small technology gap), the volume e¤ect (i.e. the impact of unilateral
measures on world production) always dominates the product mix e¤ect (due
to the changes in global sales of the cleaner versus the dirtier producer). The
opposite holds in the case of a substantial di¤erence in the emission coe¢ cients
of the two producers (e1 < e22 ).
However the extent of the technology gap per se does not lead necessarily to
correct policy prescriptions. Lahiri and Symeonidis (2007) suggest that, with
a small technology gap, unilateral mitigation measures lead to a contraction in
global pollution. We show here that, when removing their assumptions on (a)
exogenous plant location with …rms producing only in the domestic market and
exporting abroad and (b) symmetry in the size of the two areas, this …nding
may not hold. For instance, it comes out from Eq. (17) that, when TR is
the equilibrium location choice and a small technology gap is associated to
market size symmetry, unilateral climate policy does not lead to a contraction in
18

global emissions. Thus, notwithstanding the stricter mitigation measures have
a major e¤ect on the location of production, inducing the local …rm to move
abroad the whole production, they do not a¤ect global pollution. Furthermore,
if the equilibrium location choice is PR, when the highly regulated area is not
su¢ ciently larger than the less regulated counterpart (i.e. with small market
asymmetry), the unilateral climate policy leads to a rise in world emissions if
the emission technology gap is small .
Our …ndings can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 12 The only con…guration in which unilateral climate policy always leads to a fall in world emissions is characterized by (i) a su¢ ciently
larger size of the regulated area as compared to the less regulated one and (ii) a
su¢ ciently small emission technology gap.
We see in Table 1 that in such a context a higher carbon tax unilaterally
imposed by the larger area is an e¤ective policy whatever the impact of the
restrictive measures on the location choice of the domestic …rm. A corollary of
the above proposition is that, in order to assess whether unilateral climate policy
reaches its intended aim of containing global pollution, one should consider
jointly market size asymmetry and technological heterogeneity.

6

Some welfare considerations

The aim of this section is to disentangle some relevant welfare properties of
the equilibrium con…guration focusing mainly on the case where no relocation is
preferred over the alternative (either T R or P R) location choices. To this aim, in
line with the existing literature, we start by de…ning the social welfare function
^ L , government revenue generated by
^ L as the sum of consumers surplus Cs
W
I
I
L
b
the pollution tax TI and domestic …rm’s pro…ts ^ L
1 less the environmental
^ L , which is strictly convex in world production Q
^ L , with
damage function D
W
L 2 fN R; P R; T Rg. Thus, the social welfare function, when the government in
country I enacts a tighter environmental policy, writes as
^ IL = Cs
^ L
^ L bL
W
I + 1 + TI

^L
D

^ L + e2 Q
^ L )2 :
^ L = (e1 Q
with D
1
2
2
As far as the component ^ L
1 ; it has to be pointed out that it can include (i)
only pro…ts coming from domestic production (domestic pro…ts) or (ii) pro…ts
stemming from the production taking place both in the home country and in the
host country (global pro…ts). Of course, the de…nition of ^ L
1 depends on whether
…rm 1 chooses zero repatriation of pro…ts obtained from production in the host
country (case i ) or total repatriation (case ii ). Alternatively, the focus could be
placed on the objective function of the policy-maker, hypothesizing that he/she
is exclusively concerned with domestic production, due to the repercussions on
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jobs and national income.32 Finally, we de…ne as consumers’aggregate welfare
the sum of consumers’surplus and pollution tax revenues less the damage from
pollution (see Cole et al., 2009, p. 1242). For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the revenue from pollution tax is 100% returned to the taxpayers.
~ I the welfare in the baseline scenario, with tI = tII ;
Besides, we denote by W
namely in the case when the price of emissions in country I would be equal
to that found in country II; and both …rms would export from their respective
home markets. Indeed, the impact of an unilateral climate policy on the country
adopting the measures (country I) is evaluated by comparing welfare with and
without the introduction of the stricter carbon tax, that is by evaluating the
^L W
~ I ). This variation captures both the e¤ect of a rise in country
sign of (W
I
I’s pollution tax and, if this is the case, of a strategy shift as to the optimal
location choice.
^ N R and W
~ I , it
From the comparison -component by component- of W
I
emerges that there exist circumstances such that:
Proposition 13 Whenever the equilibrium location choice is NR, a unilateral
climate policy may lead to an increase in consumers’ aggregate welfare, while
reducing the local …rm’s pro…ts.
Proof. See Appendix IX
To give an intuition, let us remind here that global emissions decrease under
the N R scenario provided the emission technology gap is su¢ ciently small,33
namely if e1 > e22 : Given the de…nition of consumers’ aggregate welfare, the
above proposition shows that the same condition on emission technology coe¢ cients is decisive for a rise in consumers’aggregate welfare.
Rather interestingly, we …nd that this technology gap plays a crucial role
also for social welfare as a whole. In particular:
Proposition 14 When the equilibrium location choice is N R; the condition
e1 < e22 , under which unilateral climate policy increases global emissions and
damage, is su¢ cient to have a fall in total welfare under a more stringent carbon
tax.
Proof. See Appendix X
So, it follows from the above Proposition that the condition on emission
technology parameters determining a decrease in global emissions with respect
to the baseline (i.e. e1 > e22 ) is necessary but not su¢ cient to have an increase
in total welfare when unilateral mitigation measures are enacted. Indeed, it can
be proved that, although …rm 1’s global pro…ts decrease with respect to the
baseline, the net e¤ect on welfare as a whole may be positive. 34 For the sake
3 2 It

is worth remarking that, in the policy debate the focus is on the relationship between
unilateral climate policy and its e¤ects on domestic production. So, a "narrow" de…nition of
^ L as pro…ts coming from the output produced in the home market could be more appropriate
1
to deal with the issue at hand.
3 3 This …nding holds also in the T R scenario.
3 4 If only domestic pro…ts are considered, the results in Proposition 14 would be reinforced.
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of simplicity, we take into account only one source of market asymmetry (i.e.
we set aI > aII and bI = bII = b) and we set tII = 0, e2 = 1. We also focus on
the most favorable scenario ensuring that a fall in global emissions occurs after
an unilateral increase of the carbon tax, that is with e1 > e22 : We then obtain
cN R W
~ I > 0 i¤
(see Appendix XI for further details) that W
I

7
2 f[2e21 ( +2tI )]+[e1 ( +2e1 tI tI )] [( +2e1 tI )]g > b(3aI +aII 4c 2s+ e1 tI )
2
(18)
where = AI + AII s and is a measure of the value assigned by the national
community to the disutility of pollution. It is worth noting that, were e1 equal
to one in (18), the term in curly brackets in the LHS would be greater than the
term in brackets on the RHS.35 This implies that, when e1 is su¢ ciently high
as compared with e2 , and the sensitiveness of the local community to pollution
is signi…cant (namely with a high value of ); the unilateral climate policy has
a net positive impact on welfare. On the other hand, for a very low value of
; say ! 0, the unilateral policy would clearly make the society worse o¤, as
the negative e¤ect on …rms would prevail on the positive e¤ect on consumers’
aggregate welfare.
We can also prove that under rather general conditions, unilateral climate
measures make the society on the whole better o¤ under the N R equilibrium
location choice than under the alternative equilibrium location choices, either
T R or P R:
Proposition 15 In a range of parameters (namely e1 (tI tII ) < s < s ) where
either N R or T R may occur at equilibrium, both consumers’ aggregate welfare
and …rm’s domestic pro…ts in country I are higher under the N R equilibrium
than under the T R one, provided transport costs are su¢ ciently low. Further,
in the range of parameters (i.e. with s > s ) where either N R or P R may occur
at equilibrium, both consumers’aggregate welfare and …rm’s domestic pro…ts in
country I are higher under the N R equilibrium than under the P R one.
Proof. See Appendix XII.
It follows from the above Proposition that, there exist circumstances such
that unilateral climate measures make the society on the whole better o¤ under
the N R equilibrium location choice than under the T R one. Indeed, if a more
stringent climate policy is enacted, consumers in country I are better o¤ under
the N R equilibrium than under the T R one, as sales are larger under the former
equilibrium location choice than in the latter. Also, it is straightforward that
TbIN R > TbIT R , being TbIT R = 0 and TbIN R > 0: Besides, if the condition e1 > e22
holds, the environmental damage under T R can be higher than the corresponding one under N R:36 Lastly, if the policy-maker is concerned only with pro…ts
3 5 Therefore, if e = 1; one can easily notice that the inequality is satis…ed for a su¢ ciently
1
high value of and/or a su¢ ciently low value of b:
s
3 6 In particular, this holds whenever
< bbII +bbI :
e (t
t )
1

I

II
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II

I

determined by domestic production 37 , pro…ts under N R are higher than those
under T R.
Even in the case when the range of parameters is such that either P R or
N R can be observed at equilibrium, we …nd that the welfare under N R still
dominates that under P R. Indeed, the quantity sold by both …rms in country I
does not change when moving from N R to P R : accordingly, there is no e¤ect on
consumers’surplus when the domestic …rm chooses to partially relocate rather
than to produce only in country I: Further, the Government revenue in the
N R scenario is higher than that accruing under partial relocation and global
emissions (and hence damage) under P R are higher than those observed in the
N R case. Finally, …rm 1’s domestic pro…ts decrease when moving from N R to
P R.
^ PR W
~ I ) on one
As shown in Appendix XII, the sign of the di¤erence (W
I
T
R
~ I ), on the other one, is not clear-cut. Nevertheless, we
^
W
side, and of (W
I
can get some insights on this point when taking into account the …ndings in
Propositions 14 and 15. First, it emerges from Proposition 14 that, in the case
when N R is the optimal location choice, a condition on emission technology
parameters (i.e. e1 > e22 ) is necessary to have an increase in total welfare with respect to the baseline - under unilateral mitigation measures. Secondly,
^ N R ) can be larger than
Proposition 15 shows that total welfare under N R (W
I
^ P R ). So we can
^ T R ) or under P R (W
the corresponding welfare under T R (W
I
I
conclude that the condition(s) for global emissions to decrease is (are) a fortiori
crucial also in order to assess the sign of the change in total welfare - with
respect to the baseline - when the local …rm partially or totally relocates its
productive activities (that is under P R or T R).
To sum-up, evaluating the change in global emissions led by a more stringent
climate policy should be a guidance for policy-makers not only on the ground of
the e¤ectiveness of climate policy itself, but also on the ground of total welfare.

7

Main Conclusions

In this paper, we analyze the impact of unilateral climate policy when …rms may
expand abroad also via FDI, providing a game-theoretic international duopoly
model with endogenous plant location, which accounts for heterogeneity in both
country size and …rm emissions technology. This brings the analysis closer to
reality. We address the case in which the region imposing the more stringent
mitigation measures is the larger one and the domestic …rm in this area is endowed with a cleaner technology than its foreign rival. We consider a long-run
perspective, since climate policy is expected to remain sub-global in the foreseeable future. The model assesses how …rm and country heterogeneity in‡uence
the optimal location choice and under which institutional and technological scenarios unilateral climate policy may be e¤ective and claims of major losses in
3 7 It is worth remarking that the …ndings in Proposition 15 rely on the de…nition of domestic
pro…ts, as this is more appropriate in this context (see the discussion at the beginning of this
Section).
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domestic production and job may be overrated.
We …nd that, when the carbon price di¤erential between the two regions
(with and without stringent climate measures) is more than compensated by
transport costs (the high transport cost case), and the size of the cooperating
area is su¢ ciently large, a no relocation equilibrium may prevail in the long run,
notwithstanding the unilateral climate measures. Instead, if the carbon price
di¤erential is excessively high as compared to unit transport costs, the only
feasible equilibrium location is total relocation, with major losses in domestic
production and jobs. The e¤ectiveness of unilateral climate policy is shown to
depend on the joint e¤ect of country and …rm heterogeneity. When allowing
for …rms’ heterogeneity, in contrast with Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini (2012),
we …nd that a no relocation equilibrium is not a su¢ cient condition for having
a fall in global emissions, if a unilateral carbon tax is implemented. A large
market asymmetry coupled with a small emission technology gap is the only
con…guration in which unilateral climate policy will certainly lead to a fall in
world emissions, irrespective of the optimal location choice. Besides, a small
technology gap represents a crucial condition for making the society on the
whole better o¤.
These results give rise to some policy implications. To start with, if expected
to persist in the long run, unilateral climate policy should be moderate to avoid
domestic production moving to the less regulated area. Furthermore, the relative
size of the area with the more stringent policy is a key element in designing an
e¤ective mitigation policy. This point has already been raised in the literature
tackling the e¤ectiveness of climate policy from other perspectives, but has been
surprisingly neglected by most studies on unilateral climate policy and FDI. We
highlight two additional points: (i) the importance of considering both the direct
e¤ects of the size of the country implementing the more stringent measures
and the indirect ones via the impact on equilibrium location choice, (ii) the
importance of jointly considering market size and technological heterogeneity. In
addition, given the crucial role of the gap in emissions e¢ ciency, to implement an
e¤ective climate policy it might be relevant for policy-makers also to introduce
complementary policies for fostering international transfer of environmentally
friendly technologies to less developed (and more polluting) countries. Thus,
e¤orts to reach a multilateral climate agreement, involving at least the major
players, should be associated to initiatives favoring international transfer of
clean technologies.
The literature suggests a multiplicity of channels for international technology
di¤usion of clean technologies (Export, FDI, Licences, R&D Alliances, speci…c
mechanisms such as CDMs). An important role is played by inter-…rm technological spillovers associated to FDI (see Lee et al. 2014 on that) which are not
taken into account in this paper. Other important channels are the forward and
backward linkages associated to foreign production. The bene…ts from these
di¤erent channels are highly context-dependent. The institutional and technological characteristics of host countries and the absorptive capability of local
…rms are a decisive determinant of whether the potential bene…ts associated with
these mechanisms will be realized. The role of these factors also emerge from
23

the empirical literature on CDMs (Marconi and Sanna-Randaccio, 2014). It is
thus possible that speci…c instruments should be designed for di¤erent groups of
receiving countries. An in-depth analysis of this issue is left for further research.
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A.1

Appendix I

Proof of Proposition 1 :
Let us de…ne AI = [aI

c

e1 tI + (e2

e1 )tII ] and AII = [aII

c

e1 tI + (e2

e1 )tII ].

Then Eq. (2) may be written also as:
(AII s)
:
bII
(A.I.1)
NR
TR
Since AI > 0; because of q^1;I
+ q^1;I
> 0, and (AII
s) > 0, due to
TR
NR
> 0, it immediately follows that, whenever s < e1 (tI tII ), then
+ q^1;II
q^1;II
^ NR
^ T R < 0. Moreover, it is straightforward from Eq. (4) that ^ T R >
1
1
1
^ P R when s < e1 (tI tII ). The sign of ( ^ N R ^ T R ), on one hand, and of
1
1
1
R
( ^ T1 R ^ P
1 ); on the other hand, is ambiguous in the high transport costs case
(i.e. with s > e1 (tI tII )). Q.E.D.
R
^N
1

A.2

^ T1 R = 4
9

[s

e1 (tI

tII )]

AI
bI

[s + e1 (tI

tII )]

Appendix II

We prove now that: (i) aII (s) is an increasing function of s; (ii) there exists a
value of Gmin s.t., for any G 1 Gmin , aII (s) is a decreasing function of s; (iii)
aII js=0 > aII js=0 :
To this aim, let us …rst consider that

aII (s) =

bII [(s e1 (tI tII ))AI ]
+ [c + s + e1 tI
bI
[s + e1 (tI tII )]

aII (s) =

9
bII G
+ [c + s + e1 tI
4 [s + e1 (tI tII )]

where AI = [aI

c

e1 tI + (e2

(e2

(e2

e1 ) tII ]

e1 ) tII ]

(A.II.1)

(A.II.2)

e1 )tII ].

As far as (i), the derivative of aII (s) w.r.t. s writes as:
bI e1 2s(tI

tII ) + e1 (tI

tII )2 + bI s2 + 2bII e1 (tI tII ) [aI
bI [s + e1 (tI tII )]2

c + e2 tII

In order to evaluate the sign of this ratio, we proceed as follows. As to the
denominator, it is immediate to see that it is strictly positive. Concerning
the numerator, when evaluated at tI = tII , it writes as bI s2 > 0: So, it
su¢ ces to show that the numerator is always increasing in tI to conclude
that the sign of the above ratio is strictly positive, as by assumption tI
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e1 (tI + tII )]

> tII : The derivative of the numerator w.r.t. tI turns out to be strictly
positive, namely:
2e1 bII (aI

c

2e1 tI + e2 tII ) + 2e1 bI [s + e1 (tI

tII )] > 0:

This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
As far as (ii), given that
@aII (s)
=1
@s

9
bII G
;
4 [s + e1 (tI tII )]2

(A.II.3)

we obtain that aII (s) is a decreasing function of s i¤ G 1 Gmin with
2
Gmin = 94 [s+e1 (tbIII tII )] : Q.E.D.
Finally, concerning (iii), the di¤erence between aII js=0 and aII js=0 can
be written as
bII
bI

e1 (tI

tII )(aI

c

e1 tI e1 tII + e2 tII ) + 49 bI G
e1 (tI tII )

(A.II.4)

Since the expression (aI c + e2 tII e1 tI e1 tII ) is strictly positive due
NR
> 0, we can conclude that aII js=0 > aII js=0 : Q.E.D.
to q^1;II

A.3

Appendix III

By simple algebra it is found that 9 s : aII (s) = aII (s). Denote this value of s
as s , where
9 bI G1f
s =
+ e1 (tI tII ):
4 AI
R
^TR
^ NR
^PR
Since s is such that ^ N
1 (s ) = 1 (s ) and 1 (s ) = 1 (s ); it follows
P
R
T
R
P
R
T
R
^
that also ^ (s ) = ^ (s ), with ^
> (<) 0 for s > (<) s .
1

A.4

1

1

1

Appendix IV

In a "reverse" asymmetry scenario (i.e. with aI < aII and bI > bII ) we have:
R
^N
1

^ T1 R = 4
9

s

AII
bII

AI
bI

e1 (tI

tII )

AI
(AII s)
s2
+
+
bI
bII
bII

:

Thus we …nd that T R dominates N R i¤
s

AII
bII

AI
bI

s
+ e1 (tI
bII

tII )

AI
(AII s)
+
> 0:
bI
bII

Accordingly, since (AII s) > 0 (see Appendix I), a su¢ cient condition for T R
to be preferred over N R is given by:
bI (AII

s) > bII AI :

Q.E.D
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A.5

Appendix V

In order to prove that

R
^ T R)
@( ^ N
1
1
@e1

< 0, where:

R
^ T R)
@( ^ N
1
1
=
@e1

4
1
1
s(tI + tII )(
)
9
bI
bII
4
AI e1 (tI + tII ) AII s e1 (tI + tII )
(tI tII )
+
9
bI
bII
i
h
it su¢ ces to show that AI e1b(tII +tII ) + AII s beII1 (tI +tII ) > 0. Indeed, as far
as the term in the …rst square brackets, it is immediate to see that it is strictly
negative.
As to the second square bracket, let us consider …rst the term AI e1b(tII +tII ) :
1 t1 2s+e2 tII )
NR
We remind that q^1;II
= (aII c 2e3b
is assumed to be strictly positive.
II
So, in order to get that AI e1 (tI + tII ) > 0, it su¢ ces that AI e1 (tI + tII ) >
NR
> 0: This is the case whenever s > e1 tI ,
(aII c 2e1 t1 2s+e2 tII ) > 0 for q^1;II
which always holds since s > tII > e1 tII :
Finally, although the sign of the second term AII s beII1 (tI +tII ) is ambiguous,

one can observe that
h
AI e1 (tI +tII )
+ AII s
bI

AI

e1 (tI +tII )
bI

e1 (tI +tII )
bII

i

AII

>

s e1 (tI +tII )
bII

: This implies that

> 0. We may thus conclude that:

R
^ T R)
@( ^ N
1
1
< 0:
@e1

Q.E.D.

A.6

Appendix VI

As to the behavior of the function aII (s) as e1 varies, we get that
9 bII G(tI
4 [s + e1 (tI

@aII (s)
= (tI + tII )
@e1

tII )

2:

(A.VI.1)

tII )]

The sign of this partial derivative
is ambiguous and crucially depends on s,
p
3 GbII (tI +tII )(tI tII )
38
being it nil when s = s~ =
e1 (tI tII ) . It can be
2(tI +tII )
@aII (s)
< 0 - as the second
@e1
@aII (s)
term in Eq. (A.VI.1) will expand-, while, viceversa, @e1 > 0 for s > s~.
Moreover, de…ning as smax that
value of s such that aIImin (s) = aII (s) (see
p
II
e1 (tI tII ), and that the di¤erence
Figure 1), we …nd that smax = 3 Gb
2

shown that, for e1 (tI

3 8 Notice

@a

tII ) < s < s~; it holds that

(s)

II
that @e
is nil also for s = s2 =
1
disregarded as it is clearly negative.
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2e1 (t2
I

t2
II ) 3

q
GbII (t2
I

2(tI +tII )

t2
)
II

: This root is

p
p
p
p
(smax s~) can be written as GbII ( tI + tII )( tI + tII
tI tII ) > 0.
Therefore s~ belongs to a range of s values such that an equilibrium (either P R
or N R) exists.

A.7

Appendix VII

We consider here the relationship between s and s~: For ease of exposition, let
us recall that:
9 bI G
+ e1 (tI tII )
4 AI
p
3 GbII (tI tII )(tI + tII )
s~ =
2(tI + tII )

s =

e1 (tI

tII ):

from which we obtain that:

(~
s

s )=

h

6AI

p
GbII (tI + tII ) (tI

tII )

9bI G(tI + tII )
4AI (tI + tII )

8AI e1 (tI

i
tII ) (tI + tII )

As far as the denominator, it is easy to see that it is strictly positive. As far
as the the numerator, we …nd that it has two roots in G, namely:
h
i
p
2AI (tI tII ) bII AI 4bI e1 (tI + tII )
bII AI (bII AI 8bI e1 (tI + tII ))
G1;2 =
:
9b2I (tI + tII )
We …nd that the di¤erence (~
s s ) is strictly positive for G 2 ]G1; G2 [, as
con…rmed also by numerical examples.
Numerical simulations39 show that G1 = 0:46 and G2 = 95:83. Then G1 <
Gmin (see Appendix II), with Gmin = 17:28. Therefore values for G such that
0 G G1 can be disregarded as they are not consistent with the hypothesis
adopted in the model that G 1 Gmin De…ning as Gmax the value of G such that,
R
for any G 1 Gmax ; we have that ^ P
1II (G) 0 0; we …nd that G2 > Gmax , with
Gmax = 37:06. In addition, if one limits its attention to the case with G < G,
i.e. to the case with moderate …xed plant costs (see Section 3), being G = 26,
the values of G such that G > G2 can be disregarded. We are then allowed to
conclude that, for signi…cant (and reasonable) values of the parameter G; the
relationship s~ > s holds. Having established this ranking, also s~ > e1 (tI tII ),
i.e. s~ is located in the high transport cost area. Finally notice that both
threshold values, s~ and s ; increase in G, the former non-linearly and the latter
linearly. Evaluating these threshold values at Gmin and Gmax , respectively, we
obtain that s (Gmin ) = 3:75 and s~(Gmin ) = 6:84, and that s (Gmax ) = 7:14 and
s~(Gmax ) = 10:38; thus con…rming the ranking stated here above.
3 9 These simulations are carried out assigning to the parameters the same values as in Figures
1 and 2.
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Appendix VIII

When the equilibrium location choice is N R, we …nd:
R
bN
Q
1

and

e1 =
Q

R
bN
Q
2

2e1 (tI

e 2 = e1 (tI
Q

1
1
+
3bI
3bII

tII )

1
1
+
3bI
3bII

tII )

<0

>0

(A.VIII.1)

(A.VIII.2)

When the equilibrium location choice is T R, we …nd:

b T1 R
Q

and

Q.E.D.

A.9

e1 =
Q

bT R
Q
2

1
3bI

2s

e2 = s
Q

1
3bII

1
3bI

1
3bII

<0

> 0:

(A.VIII.3)

(A.VIII.4)

Appendix IX

As far as consumers’surplus variation under tighter environmental measures, we
NR
~ I )]: Accordingly, the sign of
~ I )(Q
^NR Q
dI
gI = bI [(Q
^NR + Q
…nd that CS
CS
2

NR

I

I

1
d
gI ) is determined by sign (Q
^NR Q
~N R) =
CS
(CS
tII ) e1 < 0:
I
I
I
3bI (tI
Further, in the N R case, the e¤ect on government revenue of imposing an
NR
+
q1;I
unilateral pollution tax in country I is given by: T^IN R T~I = tI (e1 (^
2t
e
2t
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
II 1
II e1
)) or e1 (tI tII )((^
q1;I
q^1;II
)) tII (e1 (~
q1;I
+ q~1;II
)
+
(^
q
)).
1;II
3bII
3bI
Even if the sign of this expression is ambiguous, one can note that, whenever
2tII e1
2tII e1
NR
NR
^N R T~I > 0. Assuming
(^
q1;II
q1;I
3bI ) > 0, also (^
3bII ) > 0 and thus TI
that tII = 0 implies that T^IN R T~I > 0 holds: As shown in Section 5, a
^ N R ) with respect to
higher unilateral carbon tax reduces global emissions (E
W
~W ) i¤ e1 > e2 . The same condition obviously applies
the baseline scenario (E
2
when one examines the e¤ect on damage. Then, let us consider the aggregate
consumers’ welfare. Focusing on the scenario with e1 > e22 , we can evaluate
^NR + Q
~ I )(Q
^NR Q
~ I )] + T^N R T~I .
the sign of the following expression: b2I [(Q
I
I
I
e1 tI (2aI 2c+8s 11e1 tI )
Under the assumption that tII = 0; this writes as:
+
18bI
e1 tI (aII

c 2s 2e1 tI )
:
3bII

1 tI )
NR
Since q^1;II
jtII =0 = aII c 3b2(s+e
> 0, we get that the
II
second term is strictly positive. Considering that (2aI 2c + 8s 11e1 tI ) >
2[aII c 2(s + e1 tI )] > 0 i¤ (12=7)s > e1 tI ; and that s > e1 tI ; being N R
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observed in the high transport cost case, also the …rst term is strictly positive.
Thus one may conclude that the above polynomial is strictly positive. Finally,
when moving to producers’surplus - evaluated in terms of global pro…ts - we
have that:
R
^N
1

R
NR
NR
NR
~N
= bI [(^
q1;I
+ q~1;I
)(^
q1;I
1

NR
NR
NR
NR
q~1;I
)] + bII [(^
q1;II
+ q~1;II
)(^
q1;II

R ~ NR
NR
NR
Therefore, the sign of ^ N
is determined by (^
q1;I
q~1;I
)=
1
1
1
R
NR
NR
0 and (^
q1;II q~1;II ) = 3bII 2 (tI tII ) e1 < 0. Accordingly, ^ N
1
Q.E.D.
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NR
q~1;II
)]:

1
3bI 2 (tI
~ NR <
1

tII ) e1 <
0:
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Consider the function
NR

cIN R = CS
dI
W

R
+ bN
+ TbIN R
1

b IN R :
D

NR

c
@W
NR
dI = bI (^
In order to study the sign of @tII ; we …rst remind that CS
2 q1;I +
NR
NR
NR 2
NR 2
NR 2 bNR
), and
+ q^1;II
q1;I
)
F G, TbIN R = tI e1 (^
) + bII (^
q1;II
) , 1 = bI (^
q1;I
q^2;I
2
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
b
=
D
+ q^ ) : We …nd that:
q
+ q^ ) + e2 (^
e1 (^
q
I

1;I

2

NR

dI
@ CS
@tI

+

Moreover,

R
@ bN
@ TbN R
1
+ I
=
@tI
@tI

bNR
@D
I
@tI

sign

so that sign
e1 >
e1 <

e2
2
e2
2
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1;II

!

= sign e1
bNR
@D
I
@tI

NR

2;I

2;II

e1
NR
NR
NR
(2^
q1;I
+ q^2;I
+ q^1;II
)
3

2e1
3bI

< 0 i¤ e1 >

2e1
3bII
e2
2 :

is satis…ed, it may happen that
is su¢ cient for

cN R
@W
I
@tI

+ e2

2e1 tI
3

e1
e1
+
3bI
3bII

e1
e1
+
bI
bII

=

e1 (e2

< 0:

2e1 )(bI + bII )
3bI bII

Accordingly, provided the inequality
cN R
@W
I
@tI

> 0: Viceversa, the condition

< 0: Q.E.D.
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As to the overall e¤ect on welfare of unilateral climate policy when NR is the
cN R W
~ I > 0 i¤
equilibrium location choice, we recall that W
I
2

[2e21 (AI + AII

s + 2tI )] + [e1 (AI tI (1 e1 ) + AII
[(AI + 2e1 tI + AII s)]

s + e1 tI )]

>

7
2s + e1 tI )
2
Notice that, since AI > 0 and AII s > 0 (see Appendix I), both the …rst
term in square brackets and the third one on the LHS are strictly positive. Also
b(3aI + aII

4c
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the second term is strictly positive as e1 > e2 =2: The expression on the RHS
is strictly positive as well, since (3aI + aII 4c 2s + 27 e1 tI ) > (AI + 3e1 tI +
AII s) > 0:
Moreover, [2e21 (AI + AII s + 2tI )] [(AI + 2e1 tI + AII s)] provided
2
e1 > 1=2: This last condition on e1 represents a su¢ cient condition for the
strict positivity of the LHS on the whole, being more easily satis…ed the smaller
is the gap between emission technology coe¢ cients (i.e. with e1 su¢ ciently close
to e2 = 1).

A.12

Appendix XII

Let us …rst consider the welfare properties of the T R scenario compared with
the baseline. As to consumers’surplus, when applying the same methodology
TR
^T R + Q
~ T R )(Q
^T R Q
~ T R );
gI = bI ((Q
d
CS
as in the N R case, we …nd that CS
I
I
I
I
I
2
s
TR
~
^
QI = bI < 0:
and QI
Concerning global emissions, we remind that a reduction in global emissions
^T R Q
~ 1 + e2 Q
^T R Q
~ 2 < 0; whenever e1 > e2 : Fioccurs, namely e1 Q
1
2
2
nally, both Government in country I and …rm 1 are hampered when moving
from the baseline scenario to T R. More speci…cally, the e¤ect on Government
1
revenue is given by
3bI tII (2c + s) < 0; while, as to global pro…ts, we get
that:
^ T1 R ~ 1 =

4
9bII bI

s (bII (aI

c

2e1 tII + e2 tII )

bI (aII

c

s

2e1 tII + e2 tII )) < 0:

As to the comparison between the welfare properties of equilibria under
NR
TR
^NR +
dI
dI = bI [(Q
N R and under T R; let us consider …rst that CS
CS
NR

TR

2

I

^T R) =
d
dI > 0, as (Q
^NR Q
^T R
^T R ^NR Q
CS
Q
I
I
h I )(QI
i I )]: We obtain that CS I
s e1 (tI tII )
>
0:
In
fact,
in
order
to
observe
either
N
R
or
T
R
equilibrium
3bI
location choice, one should be in the high transport cost scenario. Further,
it is straightforward that TbIN R > TbIT R , being TbIT R = 0 and TbIN R > 0: As
to the di¤erence in damage under the two equilibrium location choices, this
^ N R )2
^ T R )2 ]: Thus the sign of this di¤erence is deteris given by 2 [(E
(E
W
W
N
R
T
R
^
^ ). It comes out that (E
^NR E
^ T R ) = 1 (2e1
mined
by
sign(
E
E
W
W
W
W
3
h
i
1
bI
^T R
E
W

e2 ) s

1
bII
^NR
E
W

e1 (tI

tII )

1
1
: If the condition e1 > e22 holds,
bI + bII
bII +bI
bII +bI
bII bI that is, if s < s; where s = bII bI e1 (tI

then
>
i¤ e1 (tIs tII ) =
tII ):
Notice that this threshold value s is lower than s for su¢ ciently high plant
…xed costs (and viceversa). In particular, as
(s

s) =

[9G(bII

bI ) + 8e1 (tI tII ) (e1 (tI + tII ) (aI c + e2 tII )]bI
4 (aI c e1 tI e1 tII + e2 tII ) (bII bI )
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one …nds that (s
s) > 0 for any G > G; where G is the value such that
s (G) s = 0: Finally, as to producer surplus, if one considers only …rm 10 s
R
TR
TR
domestic pro…ts, it comes out that bN
1I > b 1I as b 1I is nil.
Moving to the P R equilibrium location choice, …rst notice that the sign of
NR
PR
dI
dI depends on sign(Q
^NR Q
^ P R ): As this latter is nil,
the di¤erence CS
CS
I
I
it immediately follows that consumer surplus in the N R scenario coincides with
that observed in the P R one. As far as the Government revenue in the P R case,
PR
NR
NR
PR
we …nd that T^IP R = tI (e1 q^1;I
); while T^IN R = tI [e1 (^
q1;I
+ q^1;II
)]: Since q^1;I
=
NR
NR
PR
^
^
q^1;I ;it immediately follows that TI > TI : Moreover, when considering global
^P R E
^ N R ) = 1 (2e1 e2 ) [s + e1 (tII tI )]:
emissions, it emerges that (E
W
W
3bII
Assuming that the condition (one of the conditions) for global emissions to
^P R E
^ N R ) > 0: Finally,
decrease holds in the N R case (P R case), yields that (E
W
W
NR
PR
PR
as to producer surplus, it results that b1I > b1I , since q^1;II is not included in
NR
PR
. Q.E.D.
= q^1;I
…rm 1’s domestic pro…ts, while q^1;I
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